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The Underground War: 
Military Mining Operations in 
support of the attack on Vimy 
Ridge, 9 April 1917 
Major Michael Boire 
Introduction 
This article aims briefly to describe the significance and evolution of military 
mining as a battlefield tactic during the Great 
War, with special reference to the role these 
underground operations played in the greatest 
success of Canadian arms - the capture of 
Vimy Ridge. 
No military historian's visit to Vimy Ridge, 
this country's most symbolic and emotion-
laden battlefield, would be complete without a 
stop at the Grange Tunnel, an infantry subway 
dug during the winter and spring of 1916-1917 
by the soldier-miners of 172 Tunnelling 
Company, Royal Engineers. They were ably 
assisted by work parties from all four veteran 
battalions of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division's 
7th Brigade: The Black Watch (42 Battalion), 
The Royal Canadian Regiment, Princess 
Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and the 
Edmonton Regiment (49 Battalion). 
Tunnel guides explain how this cool, humid, 
subterranean passage, hurriedly burrowed into 
the compacted flint and chalk of an Artois hill, 
was part of a 13-tunnel underground labyrinth. 
It protected the assaulting infantry battalions 
of the Canadian Corps from the terrible and 
ever-present dangers of German bombardment 
as they made their final move from their reserve 
trenches in the rear, forward to their assembly 
trenches in the very front of the Canadian line. 
Background 
The infantry subways, however, are only a part of the underground story of the 
Canadian Corps' operations against the 
enormously powerful German fortress on Vimy 
Ridge. A stone's throw away from the Grange 
Tunnel separating the concrete-sandbagged 
German and Canadian forward outpost lines 
are the well-manicured remains of the Duffield, 
Grange and Birkin crater groups.1 They are 
but a small fraction of the scores of craters 
produced by the German, French and British 
mining operations on the ridge during two 
years of near constant fighting. 
The first battle of the Artois in 1915 saw the 
French 10th Army begin a slow, stubborn year-
long advance up the ridge which ended in 
February 1916 when, urgently needed to stem 
the German onslaught at Verdun, it was relieved 
by the 17th Corps of the British Third Army, 
commanded by Lieut.-General Sir Julian Byng, 
a figure soon to be well-known to the Canadian 
Corps. No sooner had this aggressive formation 
of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) settled 
in to brave the hardships of a cold, wet Artois 
spring when it faced a hurricane of mine 
explosions which were carefully, violently and 
successfully orchestrated by the German 
defenders to throw the newly arrived force 
back down the slopes of the ridge. It was 
during the month of October 1916 that the 
British troops at the base of the ridge were 
relieved by the Canadian Corps, or what was 
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left of it after its bloody journey across the 
killing fields of the Somme. 
Mining operations are a fundamental, but 
seldom explored element of the French, British 
and Canadian battles for the ridge. The old 
craters which remain in that small well-
preserved piece of no man's land are silent 
witnesses to great battles lost and won. These 
mine craters are more than just deep holes in 
the ground produced by the detonation of 
enormous amounts of high explosive; they 
represent the vestiges of a particular form of 
warfare, already thousands of years old when 
war was declared in 1914. During this conflict, 
min ing t e c h n i q u e s were r e su r r ec t ed , 
modernized and vigorously applied by both 
sides. Aggressive mining characterized trench 
warfare during the middle two years of World 
War One, especially in the active sectors of the 
Western Front.2 On Vimy Ridge, commanders 
at all levels employed mines to seize the 
initiative, to dominate terrain and to inflict 
casualties, with a view to creating a local 
tactical advantage. 
Manoeuvre warfare on the Western Front 
came to an end in the late autumn of 1914. By 
the time the race to the sea ended in November, 
both sides had run out of open flanks to turn, 
strategic envelopment was now impossible. It 
became clear to both warring camps that, 
without the possibility of manoeuvre, the 
chances of obtaining a clear decisive victory on 
the Western Front were increasingly remote. 
The belligerents squared off against each other 
from positions of increasing strength along a 
400-mile corridor from the Franco-Swiss border 
to the Channel port of Flanders. Technological 
improvements in the delivery of firepower, the 
failure of tactical doctrine, very heavy casualties 
and acute shortages of ammunition left both 
sides with no option but to consolidate their 
positions and settle into a positional style of 
warfare for which their pre-war training had 
left them totally unprepared. Developing 
solutions to the problem of tactical stalemate 
with a view to restoring manoeuvre on the 
battlefield became urgent priorities for 
commanders and staffs on both sides of the 
wire. Reestablishing open warfare was 
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perceived to be the only way of achieving a clear 
decision in the field. 
In addition to improving the accuracy and 
lethality of their respective artillery, as well as 
developing the destructive potential of chemical 
weapons, both sides resurrected the mining 
techniques which had proven so effective in 
breaching fixed defences during the complicated 
siege operations which characterized so many 
of the European campaigns of the 18th and 
19th centuries. These technical solutions to 
the tactical problem of stalemate in the trenches 
evolved unevenly on both sides of no man's 
land as the conflict wore on.3 
Demonstrating the talent for innovation 
which characterized its operations throughout 
the conflict, the German Army seized the 
initiative and went underground, scoring its 
first tactical success against the British at 
Festubert (20 km north of Vimy), jus t before 
Christmas 1914. There, German tunnellers 
detonated ten mines under forward positions 
manned by an Indian Brigade and destroyed 
over a thousand yards of densely occupied 
trenches. Morale was so shaken by the surprise 
and violence of the attack that the entire Indian 
Corps had to be withdrawn into Army reserve 
to rest and recover. Underground, the Germans 
kept up the pressure; the relentless attacks 
continued without pause and the morale of the 
BEF plummeted.4 
The psychological impact of German mining 
was devastating. British soldiers in the front 
lines could actually hear the German miners 
coming at them. The noise of their picks and 
shovels carried for long distances underground, 
as did the sounds they made while placing 
their explosives charges under British forward 
positions. Soldiers felt they had no defence 
against the terrible, inevitable fate of being 
buried alive or blown apart by a sudden 
thundering explosion coming up at them from 
the bowels of the earth.5 By the spring of 1915, 
it had become difficult for the British infantry 
commanders to keep their soldiers in the front 
lines of sectors where German miners were 
known to be active.6 
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Struggling to regain the initiative, the BEF 
attempted to stop the German underground 
offensive but its efforts were ineffective. As 
senior British commanders soon realized, Royal 
Engineer units at brigade and division level 
were short of soldiers trained in mining as well 
as the necessary officer expertise to direct 
operations from underground. Time was 
running short and prompt decisive action was 
required. The BEF was being blown out of its 
trenches and could do little to defend itself. 
Informed of this deteriorating situation and 
acting on the advice of several notable 
personalities within the British mining industry 
who were concerned by the inertia of senior 
British military leadership,7 Lord Kitchener, 
the Secretary of State for War, approved the 
immediate recruitment and deployment of 
specialized tunnelling companies to the Western 
Front. The organization, training and tactical 
employment of these companies were to be the 
responsibility of the Royal Engineers. Wherever 
possible they were to be composed entirely of 
professional miners who could be recruited 
and organized where they worked. 
The formation of these new Royal Engineer 
tunnelling companies began during the winter 
of 1914-1915 and was treated as an urgent 
priority by the War Office. In the coalfields and 
pit mines of Britain and the Dominions, mining 
engineers and geologists volunteered to become 
the company and platoon commanders. Mining 
foremen with a taste for adventure were found 
and promoted to senior NCO rank. They would 
become the shift supervisors underground. 
Those miners, declared to be surplus to the 
war effort at home, were encouraged to join 
17 
The Duffield, Grange and Birkin Crater Groups, now preserved and manicured. The entrance to the Grange 
Tunnel is on the left. 
3
Boire: Military Mining Operations in Support of the Attack on Vimy Ridge
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1992
these new, secret "underground" organizations. 
Sometimes events moved very quickly. One 
tunnelling company was recruited and formed 
on a Thursday morning in Yorkshire and was 
underneath German forward positions in 
Flanders the following Wednesday afternoon.8 
Once at the front, the plan was simple. After 
a very short period of military training these 
companies would be rushed to the sectors 
where their expertise was most needed. Initially 
they would defend the BEF against enemy 
mines by destroying the Germans underground 
in their own tunnels, before they could plant 
their mines beneath friendly positions. This 
tactic was labelled defensive mining and 
depended upon tunnellers quickly finding 
enemy tunnels and then collapsing them with 
small explosive charges called camoufiets. 
Having neutra l ized the enemy's efforts 
underground, British miners would then push 
their own tunnels forward underneath German 
positions, thereby regaining the initiative 
(offensive mining). The Germans had to be 
stopped underground if the British and French 
were to remain in the war. 
The i n t roduc t i on of Royal Engineer 
tunnelling companies, composed of well-
trained and highly-motivated professional 
miners, to the Western Front was initially 
welcomed by commanders in the field, but it 
was staunchly resisted by the uppermost 
echelons of the BEF who "were unenthusiastic 
about taking in some hundreds of miners 
with no military training at all and [who had] 
a reputa t ion for fierce independence."1 0 
Despite these reservations, the underground 
menace posed such a serious threat to the 
BEF that the shared perception amongst the 
senior commanders was that only resolute, 
effective and coordinated action could defeat 
it. To e n s u r e economy of effort and 
concentration of force, tunnelling companies 
were c e n t r a l i z e d a t Army level and 
commanded by a Royal Engineer colonel who 
carried the title, "Controller of Mines". This 
officer provided technical advice to his army 
commander and assigned mining priorities 
in the Army ' s a r e a of o p e r a t i o n s in 
consultation with the commander's staff and 
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according to the commander's operational plan. 
Further up the chain of command was the 
"Inspector of Mines" stationed at HQ BEF. This 
officer of general rank allocated companies to 
armies according to operational priorities 
established by the commander of the British 
Expeditionary Force.11 
A total of 33 companies of tunnellers was 
deployed to the Western Front in the summer 
of 1916. The Commonwealth was well 
represented in the British Army Mining Service 
with one New Zealand, three Canadian and 
three Australian companies serving alongside 
their Imperial counterparts. When at full 
strength, a company could field 500-600 miners 
and was often reinforced by fatigue parties 
drawn from infantry battalions in reserve 
(always a popular job with tired soldiers). With 
attachments, company strengths were often 
well into four figures, as was the case with 172 
Company while it dug the Grange Tunnel from 
November 1916 to March 1917.12 
In 1915, British mining operations on the 
Western Front were limited in scope and 
essentially defensive. Digging was restricted to 
shallow tunnels, seldom surpassing 100 yards 
long and 20 feet deep. The charges were also 
small , rare ly exceeding 10 ,000 lbs . 1 3 
Gunpowder and gun cotton, though far too 
sensitive to enemy fire, were the only explosives 
available in great quantity. Many miners 
perished when the explosives bags they were 
carrying were hit by small arms fire or shrapnel. 
Throughout 1915 the Germans maintained 
the momentum they had initiated during the 
a u t u m n of 1914 though the p resence 
underground of unfriendly miners from the 
BEF caused them to be much more circumspect, 
as the tunnellers' war diaries testify.14 
Without doubt 1916 was the most active 
year of the underground war. When the last of 
the tunnelling companies was recruited and 
deployed in early summer, the 33 companies 
could field 24,000 miner-soldiers. Digging 
techniques had improved to the point where 
miners could push tunnels deep underneath 
the enemy at a rate of 20 feet a day, soil 
conditions permitting. Underground listening 
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devices had been developed which could 
accurately detect German tunnelling up to 100 
yards away.15 
Ammonal, a new and powerful explosive, 
could be safely handled and transported, even 
under fire. It was used in huge quantities and 
produced impressive results. A new French 
invention, le cordeau detonant ("det cord" in 
Canadian field engineer parlance), assured a 
reliable alternate means of exploding heavy 
mine charges, which by this time were being 
measured in tons of explosives. 
During that same year the tunnelling 
companies exploded a total of 750 mines along 
the front line of the BEF. The Germans 
answered with 696 devices of their own.16 In 
the Arras sector, which included Vimy Ridge, 
ten Royal Engineer tunnelling companies dug 
thousands of yards of shafts, exploding well 
over 100 large mines underneath or close to 
German positions. The majority of the craters 
still visible today near the Grange Tunnel were 
fired during 1916. The tide was turning. On 
the ridge, as in other sectors of the Western 
Front, the Germans were losing the initiative, 
and were not to regain it. 
While British companies were busy on Vimy 
Ridge, No.l Canadian Tunnelling company 
began digging underneath Saint Eloi. It was to 
be the longest mine shaft to date (1,650 feet), 
at the greatest depth (125 feet) and after 9 
months of dangerous work contained the 
biggest charge of the war (95,600 lbs of 
Ammonal). It was exploded, along with 18 
other large mines (a total of 1,000,000 lbs of 
Ammonal) as part of the Messines offensive in 
June 1917. 
At the end of 1916, pressures on the German 
war economy had forced the recall of 125,000 
miners from the Army to reinforce the industrial 
effort at home; 50,000 more men followed in 
June 1917.18 As these men were not replaced, 
enemy underground activity dropped off 
dramatically. Furthermore, the new German 
defensive doctrine introduced in December 
1916, called for the creation of multiple and 
mutually supporting defensive belts thickened 
with numerous strongpoints. Thus the 
deployment of the German Army in much 
greater depth pushed many attractive enemy 
targets well back from no man's land, effectively 
placing them out of range of BEF tunnellers.19 
In comparison to the previous 
year, 1917 was relatively quiet; 
117 British mines were detonated, 
as compared to 106 German 
charges.20 The war underground 
had become, at best, a series of 
skirmishes. As a result, from 
November of 1916 onwards, far 
fewer tunnelling companies were 
required to face the rapidly 
decreas ing German menace 
underground. Consequently, more 
miners could be employed digging 
infantry subways, which was the 
case in the Vimy sector. 
By the beginning of 1917, the 
BEF had won the war underground 
but not without paying a steep 
price in soldier-miners. 
An aerial view of the reconstructed 
trenches at Vimy. (NAC PA 183533) 
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Under Vimy Ridge 
The staff of the Canadian Corps began planning for the monumental task of 
seizing Vimy Ridge on 21 November 1916, 
while the last remnants of the Corps were 
finishing the long march from the battlefields 
of the Somme Valley to the hills of the Artois.21 
From the beginning of the preparation process, 
planners at all levels came to grips with 
numerous and seemingly insurmountable 
problems. To their everlasting credit they 
solved all of them.22 
To make good the losses of the Somme 
campaign, where a quarter of its fighting 
strength23 had been lost, the Corps' infantry 
battalions had to absorb and train thousands 
of newly arrived reinforcements. In preparation 
to equip, supply and maintain the front line 
units before and during the battle ahead, the 
Corps' engineer units began construction on 
new roads , sewage sys tems, ba r r acks , 
ammunition dumps, water reservoirs, artillery 
gun emplacements, trenches, tunnels and 
dugouts . An aggressive, effective and 
technological ly soph i s t i ca t ed ar t i l lery 
programme was developed to destroy the 
hundreds of enemy strongpoints, trench 
systems and barbed wire obstacles which would 
put Canadian attackers at great risk. It would 
not only protect Canadian infantry while they 
closed with and destroyed the enemy, but 
would silence enemy artillery during the attack 
itself.24 
Given the tactical stalemate, the lack of 
manoeuvre room left planners with no choice 
but to prepare an attack which took the form of 
a determined simultaneous assault25 by all 
four of the Corps' infantry divisions advancing 
abreast from their assembly trenches, across 
the ridge, to the Douai Plain beyond. But as in 
any attack, success in the initial stages would 
be critical. Should the infantry be held up in 
any way they would lose the protection of the 
creeping barrage which would simply continue 
on across the battlefield, at a marching pace, 
without them. 
With this in mind planners looked closely at 
the enemy's fortified trench systems. Across 
the 7,000 yards of Corps frontage, many 
20 
German strongpoints sheltered their machine 
gun crews in deep artillery-proof dugouts which 
would protect them from even the most 
sustained bombardment by the Corps' heavy 
artillery. Leaving these powerful positions 
intact would permit those machine gunners to 
inflict terrible casualties amongst the attacking 
infantry battalions. How could these positions 
be destroyed? 
Given the successful conclusion of the 
u n d e r g r o u n d campa ign of 1916, it is 
understandable that the staff turned first to 
the soldier-miners whose offensive mining 
capability had produced much recent success. 
As German activity underground had decreased 
dramatically as 1916 drew to a close, it was 
reasonable to expect there would be little 
effective resistance to tunnelling operations 
aimed at these strongpoints. 
The brutal lessons of the Somme campaign 
weighed heavily upon the Corps planners who 
expressed a strong preference for expending 
explosives and artillery shells rather than the 
precious lives of Canadian infantrymen. 
Consequently, initial attack planning called 
for 26 German strongpoints, immediately in 
front of the Corps front line, to be attacked with 
mines.26 In all four divisional areas, these 
offensive mines were to be fired at Z-hour, the 
very moment the attack was to be launched. 
There was no intention of exploding any of 
these charges before the main attack as had 
been done near Beaumont Hamel on the first 
morning of the Somme offensive. There the 
detonation of the Hawthorne mine, though 
destroying its intended target, had warned the 
German defenders in adjacent sectors of the 
line that a British attack was imminent. 
At first, the Corps' staff appeared to be 
mesmerized by what they perceived to be the 
advantages to be realized from offensive mining. 
In analyzing the 19 distinct mine crater groups 
fired by the French, Germans, British and 
Canadians in the four miles of no man's land 
separating the combatants in the Vimy sector, 
it was concluded that not one of these 19 
groups constituted an insurmountable obstacle 
to movement. However, the analysis did advise 
that four of these crater groups should be 
avoided as they had been blown in clay and as 
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such were always full of water.27 Clearly, 
offensive operations through these areas would 
inevitably bog down. However, the remaining 
15 groups, most containing several deep craters, 
were deemed to be "no obstacle" and as such 
"easily traversable by small parties of men",28 a 
euphemism, perhaps, for attacking infantry 
platoons. 
In fairness, this conclusion was well 
intentioned and based upon extensive and 
balanced analysis. Officers of the Corps staff 
had visited the La Boiselle - Fricourt sector of 
the Somme battlefield, arguably one of the 
most heavily-mined sectors of the Western 
Front. There no man's land was filled by some 
of the largest craters yet fired. Local British 
commanders told the Canadian visitors that 
these enormous holes posed no problems. They 
were routinely navigated and traversed by 
patrols and raiding parties from both sides. 
Given the Corps staffs keen desire to use the 
miners and in light of the favourable testimony 
they had acquired in the field, the staff 
minimized the potential obstacles which further 
mining might cause assaulting Canadian 
battalions as they launched their assault 
towards the waiting Germans. 
At the sharp end, where the bullets flew and 
the shells exploded, the officers whose job it 
was to lead their soldiers in the assault were no 
longer confident that mining was always 
worthwhile. Though the tunnellers had turned 
the tables on the Germans, thereby making 
their own trenches safer places to live and 
fight, three years of war had taught that while 
mines could destroy strongpoints, their craters 
became enormous obstacles to movement. 
From the moment it arrived in the Vimy 
sector, the Canadian Corps' raiding and 
patrolling policy had been aggressive.29 By the 
month of March 1917 every assaulting battalion 
had sent out many patrols into and across the 
wire. Raiding parties had stormed into German 
defenses to destroy trenches and dugouts as 
well as to capture prisoners. Most operations 
had been successful, though losses were 
sometimes high, especially in 4 Division.30 
Practical experience produced self-confidence. 
Many junior infantry commanders had been 
across no man's land and into the enemy's 
front lines on more than one occasion. Their 
frequent forays made them aware of the 
difficulties caused by the existing crater groups. 
Though it was a fact that craters could be 
crossed or bypassed, any mine explosion could 
cause more damage and create commensurately 
harder going than had been foreseen. Infantry 
commanders, as the attack grew near, balked 
at the possibility of the Corps' mining plan 
adding new and dangerous obstacles for them 
to cross.31 
More to the point, they realized that the 
infantry's survival depended on its ability to 
stay close to the creeping barrage. This alone, 
with its thunderous, destructive curtain of 
high explosive, gas and shrapnel could keep 
German heads down and away from their 
weapons until the infantry could close with 
and destroy them in their trenches and dug-
outs. During raid after raid, platoons, 
companies and sometimes entire battalions 
had followed a barrage, manoeuvring jus t 
behind its deadly effects. What had been done 
on numerous occasions since the Corps' arrival 
in December 1916 could be accomplished on a 
larger scale when it came time to face the 
Germans at Z-hour. Creating further obstacles 
to movement, however well-intentioned, was 
definitely not welcome. 
It was this perception, widespread among 
Canadian infantry commanding officers and 
solidly suppor t ed by the i r formation 
commanders, which caused some important 
last-minute changes to the mining orders 
contained in the final Canadian Corps Scheme 
of Operations. Lieut.-General Sir Julian Byng, 
the much-respec ted commander of the 
Canadian Corps, supported his subordinate 
commanders and heeded their concerns on the 
question of further mining. As a result, of 26 
large mines of various types initially planned to 
support the assault,32 four were abandoned 
due to technical difficulties, two were detonated 
before 9 April for defensive purposes, five were 
fired as planned, eight were prepared but not 
used and seven others, though mentioned in 
the earliest stages of planning do not appear in 
subsequent tunnellers' war diaries as having 
been undertaken.33 
21 
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The development of mining operations in 
4th Division's area leading up to the attack 
appears to vindicate both the Corps' staff view 
that mining was 
a useful tool and 
did have a viable 
role in support of 
o f f e n s i v e 
operations; and 
the front line 
i n f a n t r y 
perception that 
mining was an 
extremely risky 
tac t ic whose 
r e su l t s were 
a t bes t un -
predictable and 
at worst most 
dange rous to 
those i t was 
designed to 
suppor t , t he 
infantry. 
In th i s di-
vis ional a rea , 
four major 
mining oper-
ations had been 
planned. The 
most important 
was abandoned 
due purely to technical reasons, a second was 
carried through to completion and achieved 
the desired results and two were abandoned 
without significant effect on the outcome of the 
battle.34 
In the initial planning, a German redoubt 
nicknamed the Pimple was earmarked for 
destruction at Z-hour by a deep offensive mine.34 
This well-defended enemy position was built 
into the chalk quarries of Givenchy-en-Gohelle 
on the northern end of the ridge opposite the 
British positions. It bristled with dozens of 
machine guns whose fire dominated the 
northern, western and eastern slopes of 4th 
Division's objective, Hill 145. Of all the features 
making up the ridge, Hill 145 was the highest, 
tactically the most important and certainly the 
most heavily fortified. Above and beyond its 
22 
own formidable defences, Hill 145 was solidly 
supported from the north by the guns of the 
Pimple. Though the division had the shortest 
a s sau l t , never 
more than 800 
ya rds deep in 
any ba t t a l ion 
sector , i t was 
uphill all the way. 
No one doubted 
the enormity of 
the task facing 
4 th Division. 
Therefore any 
i n t e r f e r e n c e 
coming from 
the Pimple 
would great ly 
jeopardize the di-
vision's chances 
of success. To 
ensure its total 
n e u t r a l i z a t i o n 
before the attack, 
a second deep 
mine was 
p l anned to 
des t roy an 
ad jacen t and 
mutua l ly s u p -
porting enemy 
position in le Bois de Givenchy, just north of 
the Pimple. 
Both mines were par t of the earliest 
preparations for the attack. In a very real 
sense both of these projects were inspired by 
the 19 great mines which were at that time 
being carefully laid underneath the German 
defences on Messines Pudge, as part of the 
Passchendaele offensive planned for later that 
year in the Flanders sector. Unfortunately, 
work on both mines was halted in the early 
stages due to technical reasons. The Pimple 
mine tunnel was being driven through a layer 
of blue clay which, though deep under the 
target, was dangerously shallow at the tunnel 
face. During the first days of construction, a 
barrage of friendly fire from the Corps' heavy 
artillery, though aimed at German forward 
Remnants of the Canadian Outpost Line, now preserved with 
concrete sandbags. 
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positions on the Pimple, fell far short and 
landed squarely on top of the tunnel face, 
collapsing it completely. Given the shallow 
depth of the tunnel and the ever-increasing 
weight of shellfire in that sector, work was 
halted and the operation discontinued. Work 
on the second Pimple mine was halted when it 
became apparent that it would not be completed 
in time. On the morning of the attack, that 
tunnel was only 100 feet from its target. So 
near yet so far.35 
Had these two mines been completed and 
fired the subsequent battle for Hill 145 might 
have been far different. It is reasonable to 
assume that the effect of these two massive 
explosions on the Pimple would have had the 
same effect on its defenders as the Messines 
Ridge mines had on their victims: total 
annihilation of the defenders and a walk-over 
for the attackers. With its garrison neutralized, 
the Pimple could not have offered organized 
resistance. Hill 145 might have been outflanked 
from the north by its attackers and would not 
have wreaked the havoc it did on the battalions 
of 11 Brigade. It would certainly have saved 
many lives in 10 Canadian Infantry Brigade, 
whosejob it was to seize the Pimple on 12 April. 
Given the impossibility of dealing directly 
with the Pimple's defences, they were masked 
by an elaborate smoke and shrapnel barrage 
during the opening phase of the attack.36 
However, the problem of securing 4th Division's 
northern flank remained. To ensure that 12 
Brigade's battalions were protected as they 
took on the defenders of Hill 145, three mines 
were laid and blown in the Kennedy crater 
group on that formation's northern flank. The 
mines went up as scheduled, burying and 
killing many German defenders in the front 
line and wrecking many yards of German mining 
galleries underneath.37 With debris from the 
explosions still falling, the 73rd Battalion (The 
Black Watch) dashed forward to seize the 
farthest lips of the newly formed craters which 
anchored the Brigade's strong defensive flank 
guard which protected, in turn, the 72nd and 
38th Battalions attacking to the south. Those 
three mines had achieved the desired tactical 
result. 
Two other series of mines had been included 
in the original plan but were dropped as the 
attack drew near. The first, immediately to the 
south of the Kennedy craters consisted of five 
large mines which were to be fired under 
enemy outposts built along the lips of existing 
older craters in the German front line.38 They 
were abandoned in deference to local 
commanders' misgivings. Itwas over this piece 
of ground that the 73rd's sister battalions, the 
72nd and 38th, charged forward. The second 
series, three mines in all, planted underneath 
the older Broadmarsh crater on the boundary 
between the 3rd and 4th Divisions was not 
detonated, again due to local commanders' 
objections.39 The 54th and 102nd Battalions, 
in 4 Division as well as the 42nd Battalion (The 
Black Watch) in the 3rd Division traversed this 
sector quickly, giving credence to the infantry's 
concerns. 
From its reappearance in 1914 when it had 
shown so much promise as a means of restoring 
mobility to the battlefield, to its great mining 
offensive under Messines Ridge in 1917, military 
mining had proven to be a classic double-
edged sword, as dangerous to friend as to foe. 
The trench fighters of the Canadian Corps, 
inhabi t ing a terrifying world of violent 
bombardment, eerie calm and sudden death, 
understood this reality and employed this old 
yet adapted technique accordingly. 
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